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The Pattern of Central Bank Development: 
Past, Present and Future 
 
By C.A.E. Goodhart 
Financial Markets Group 





Commercial banking began in Italy in the 16th century.  The public banks of Naples were in the 
forefront of that development.  Since then, they, and the practice of banking world-wide, have been 
undergoing a continuous process of development, partly in response to the changing structure and 
needs of the macro-economy and partly in response to crises, some man-made, e.g. in the guise of 
wars and political disturbances, and some not, e.g. natural disasters such as plagues and 
earthquakes. 
 
The early Italian banks introduced many crucial innovations, such as lending on the basis of 
collateral, and the use of bills of exchange.  The public banks of Naples had a special role in this 
regard, since they developed a flexible form of deposit certificate, the fedi di credito, based on 
currency, or other assets placed with them, that were flexible, redeemable and transferable, and, 
arguably, also the first recorded instances of cash credit overdraft facilities, see Chapter 2, Section 5, 
by Costabile and Nappi.  TheseThis remarkable innovations are  is described at greater length in 
several of the subsequent Chapters, notably in Chapters 2-4, and their balance sheets of these banks 
(1587-1806) are reported in Chapter 5 (Balletta, Balletta and Nappi). 
 
In particular, the paper by Avallone and Salvemini, Chapter 4, not only describes why the public 
banks in Naples, connected to large charities,1 became preferred to private bankers, (mostly 
managed by foreigners, e.g. Genoese), but also records why the fedi di credito were so popular.  
Silver coins were subject to clipping and their other transactions costs, e.g. ensuring safety, weight, 
                                                             
1   This charitable connection provides the main theme of Chapter 3 by Di Meglio, ‘Before  Public Banks: 
Charity, Welfare and the Economy in 15th Century Naples’.  This is based on the archival records of the SS 





forgery, etc., were also greater than those of the fedi di credito.  Such coins were also subject in 
many regions to periodic debasement, following by inflation, and then ‘crying down’ to halt such 
inflation, all of which led to a greater demand for the paper of stable public banks, see Neal, Chapter 
6.  And, of course, there were usually many different coins in circulation at any time, whose value 
varied continuously against each other.  One of the main roles of public banks, such as the Bank of 
Amsterdam, (see Chapter 13 by Quinn and Roberds) was to provide a more stable and efficient 
medium of exchange, notably for bills of exchange, than could be obtained through the use of coins 
of shifting values. 
 
Not all the developments that have occurred in the banking industry since then have been as 
beneficial as the fedi di credito.  The charitable impulse that was associated both with the 
Neapolitan banks and several other early Italian banks, such as the Monte de Paschi di Siena, is now 
somewhat conspicuous by its absence.  Under the Amato-Carli Act of 1990 there was an attempt in 
Italy to restore the role of non-profit organisations, in the guise of Banking Foundations, in the 
governance of the newly privatised banks, as recorded by Giannola, Chapter 16; but this model has 
not been entirely successful.  Many would, however, argue that the shift of investment banking in 
the USA from partnerships to limited liability companies, and the switch of housing finance from 
mutual associations, (S&Ls in the USA, Building Societies in the UK), to regular commercial banks 
have been deleterious in effect.  Jerry Epstein, Chapter 15, notes that non-profit-maximising banks 
have not been as pro-cyclical as shareholder banks, and argues that a larger share of public sector or 
stakeholder banks would provide a beneficial diversification for the financial system. 
 
Whereas bank intermediation has, on balance, been enormously beneficial, (lending to keen 
borrowers, providing a liquid and safe source of financial assets, running the main payment systems, 
smoothing out the jagged fluctuations of cash flow, etc., etc.), there is one facet of its activities that 
remains of persistent concern, which is that bankers, being normal human beings, and their banks 
tend to amplify the inherent cyclical fluctuations of our economy.  During good times profits are 
high; asset prices rise; borrowing gets repaid; defaults are low; and bankers tend to lend more, 
thereby reinforcing the boom.  And when the bust occurs, the amplification feedback mechanism 




Particularly during the boom period this amplification process can threaten price stability and also 
the adherence of the local paper currency to an external standard of value, such as the gold 
standard or a pegged exchange rate.  Although several of the early Central Banks, such as the Bank 
of England and Banque de France, were founded to help finance their country’s war expenditure, a 
role that remained paramount during major wars, e.g. in the Napoleonic era, WWI and II, these 
nationally pre-eminent banks soon became accorded with the quasi-political task of managing the 
monetary and banking system as a whole, so as to maintain price stability. 
 
The greater the power of the issuer of local currency, the less its value has needed to be strictly tied 
to its metallic content in gold, silver or copper, i.e. seignorage will be greater.  As Eichengreen shows 
in Chapter 14, the US dollar, the linchpin of the international monetary system, no longer has any 
firm link to a precious metal.  He argues that, historically, the conditions supporting an international 
currency, besides its metallic content, were size, stability, liquidity and power.  Several of the early 
Italian City States, Genoa, Florence and Venice had the attributes that made their currencies widely 
acceptable in international trade.  The Neapolitan silver piastra was not so used; Eichengreen 
suggests that this may have been owing to some political limitations. 
 
Just as the following Chapters record the evolving patterns of commercial banking in Naples, and 
more widely in Europe, so it is the purpose of this Chapter to analyse and record the changing 
pattern of Central Banking.  The history of Central Banking, as I have outlined previously, (Goodhart, 
2015), can be divided into periods of consensus about the roles and functions of Central Banks, 
interspersed with periods of uncertainty, often following a crisis, during which Central Banks (CBs) 










1873-1914 Gold standard; 
Real Bills Doctrine; 




1914-1933  Break-down of GS; 
Break-down of Real Bills Doctrine; 
Unemployment and inflation 
1934-1970 Fiscal (Keynesian) dominance; 
CB subject to Finance Ministry; 
Financial repression; 
Interest rates used for BoP, otherwise low 
 
1971-1990  Stagflation; 
Monetarism vs Keynesianism; 
Liberalisation and Financial Crises 









Most monetary historians, and this book is about monetary history, will be familiar with these key 
aspects of CB history.  It may, however, be worthwhile emphasising a couple of features from this 
history, which have become less familiar during recent decades.  These are, first, the Real Bills 
Doctrine and the second is the conclusion of much analysis into the onset of the depression in the 
USA in 1929-33, that this was largely caused by excessive competition in the banking and wider 
financial systems, since that lowered profit margins and encouraged a riskier reach for yield.  Many 
of the more stable banking structures, including most likely the public banks of Naples, have been 
cartelised.   
 
The Real Bills Doctrine 
 
Prior to the 20th century, most government deficits were incurred by the need to finance war.  
Almost by definition, war is not productive, so monetary finance of war-time expenditure was 
inherently inflationary.  So, banks, and especially Central Banks, tried to avoid purchasing 
government paper, beyond the minimum necessary to satisfy politicians’ willingness to extend their 
Charter.  Moreover, until the middle of the 19th century the rulers of many European states were 
either unwilling or unable to repay all the debts that occurred to finance their wars, employing 
various forms of default, either strategically or under duress.  Consequently, the better established 
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banks often had more credibility and a better record of repayment than their rulers.  This was one 
reason why in several countries debt management was largely delegated to the Central Bank.   
 
Larry Neal argues in Chapter 6 that Bartolomeo d’Aquino’s establishment of the final public bank, 
the Banco del Santissimo Salvatore in 1640, was motivated essentially by the need to manage the 
outstanding public debt (most of which he had purchased at fire sale prices in the previous years 
from the original holders).  Thereafter, it became recognized as the government’s bank but existed 
harmoniously with the original seven public banks, at least after the Masaniello revolt was 
repressed. 
 
Moreover, absent wartime, rulers during these early centuries often ran a surplus, and there was not 
always a large stock of short-dated public sector debt, through which to operate in order to manage 
the money market.  So, the preferred liquid asset for money market operations, and for Central 
Banks’ open market operations, became bills of exchange, short-dated credit instruments drawn by 
the borrower, and, when accepted, became a two-name bill.  Here the main distinction was between 
real bills, largely drawn by industry on the basis of trade and inventory, and speculative bills, which 
were drawn largely for the purpose of purchasing assets, which were hoped to rise in price.   
 
The basic idea was that the volume of real bills would rise and fall with the volume of output and 
trade, so that the monetarisation of real bills would not lead to inflation; according to the quantity 
theory of money, where MV = PY, the Real Bills Doctrine would bring about a close positive 
correlation between movements in M and Y, leaving P stable.  Similarly, real bills would be self-
liquidating, since, being based on trade and production, the borrower would always be able to repay 
the bill from the proceeds of the sales involved in the trade and sale of goods in process.  In contrast, 
the repayment of speculative bills would depend on the course of asset prices, which, being 
uncertain, meant that they were much more subject to default. 
 
One of the key founders of the Federal Reserve System, Paul Warburg’s enthusiasm for “real bills” 
may have been based on his experience of mutual monitoring of other bankers’ acceptances in 
Germany, with ultimate recourse to borrowing against short-term acceptances from other banks, 
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ultimately from the Reichsbank.  Perhaps the Banco de San Salvatore performed this lender of last 
resort function in the case of Naples. 
 
A great virtue, therefore, of this doctrine, was that it unified the conduct of monetary policy to 
maintain price stability with the maintenance of financial stability.  After the collapse of the Real Bills 
Doctrine this unification has fallen by the wayside with both the objectives of price stability and 
financial stability being seen as separate, requiring largely differing instruments, and sometimes 
even potential conflict.   
 
The reason why the Real Bills Doctrine failed during the interwar period was that it was inherently 
procyclical.  When the US economy went into a nosedive after 1929, trade and production declined 
by so much that the volume of real bills declined very sharply.  There were not enough real bills left 
to provide the Federal Reserve System with a sufficient basis to expand the money supply and 
counter the Depression.  As is well known, the operational mechanism of the Fed had been based on 
the Real Bills Doctrine, and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Allan Meltzer (2003) both blamed the 
adherents of Fed staffers to the Real Bills Doctrine for their incapacity to undertake sufficiently 
expansionary monetary policy during that period.  Indeed, more generally, adherents of the 
Currency School of monetary policy have always been strongly antagonistic to the Real Bills Doctrine, 
whereas adherents of the Banking School tended to make it a core plank of their policy proposals, 
prior to the inter-war disaster, and have had something of a soft spot for it even afterwards, 
although now clearly recognising its basic flaw. 
 
The dangers of excessive competition in banking? 
 
Whenever there is a crisis, there is an immediate surge of studies to explain the causes of that 
disaster.  There were a number of studies done in the US in the 1930s, whose general conclusion 
was that a prime cause of the financial crisis had been excessive competition in financial markets, 
thereby driving profit margins down, and causing bankers to search for yield, quite largely by taking 




One reason for the resilience of the Neapolitan banks as a group may have come from a cartel-like 
arrangement among them, as they recognized each other’s fedi di credito and accepted them as 
deposits.  A large part of the daily work of the clerks was to redeem notes of other banks that they 
had accepted.   
 
Although there was no equivalent inter-war financial crisis in the UK, the economic downturn was 
again partly attributed to the same cause, excessive competition.  Consequently, both industrial and 
financial strategy during the 1930s largely involved the attempt to corral industrial and financial 
groups into cartels, whether formal or informal, with the aim of reducing pricing competition and 
restoring profit margins to a level that would maintain the solvency of the firms involved, whether 
financial or industrial.  As recorded, for example, in Sayers’ history of the Bank of England (1976), 
much of Montagu Norman’s role during this period took the form of being cheerleader for such 
industrial and financial reorganisation into cartel-like structures.   
 
It is, at least, possible that one of the reasons for the very low level of bank failures and financial 
crises during the subsequent period, 1934-1970, was that excessive competition in the banking 
sector was constrained, and profit margins remained comfortable.  As has been frequently 
remarked, the growing liberalisation of financial markets during and after the 1970s, was often the 
precursor of subsequent financial crises, in some part because competition, if unchecked, could lead 
to a combination of declining profitability and growing risk-taking.  It is notable that the countries 
which survived the Great Financial Crisis (2008/9), such as Sweden, Canada and Australia, had 
domestic retail banking markets that were largely oligopolistic in character, without much 
competition from foreign banks.  Nevertheless, the earlier views that competition in this field could 
be both excessive and dangerous have not only been disregarded in recent years, but largely turned 
on their head, insofar as most current commentators seem to believe that start-up challenger banks 
provide an unalloyed benefit to the macro economy.   
 
How did the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) occur? 
 
As is now quite generally accepted, one of the failings of Central Banks that led up to the GFC was 
their failure to appreciate Minsky’s analysis (19xx) that (macroeconomic) stability would lead to 
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financial instability.  Thus there were some generally accepted myths prior to 2007, which central 
bankers and financial regulators were as prone to hold as commercial bankers, commentators and 
other outsiders.  These myths were:- 
1) Price stability, plus Basel Capital Adequacy Ratio requirements, would guarantee solvency; 
2) With solvency thus guaranteed, liquidity will always be available via wholesale markets; 
3) That maturity mismatch in the banking system can be ignored. 
 
The tendency of regulators to take financial stability for granted was reinforced by the mind-set of 
current mainstream macro-economists.  In their case, the predominant macro-economic model, the 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, assumed a world of representative agents 
who never ever defaulted.  Since they never defaulted, lending to them was as riskless as lending to 
the government.  There was, therefore, no need for banks, since the riskless agents could borrow 
and lend amongst themselves at the single current, riskless interest rate.  Accordingly, the whole 
panoply of financial intermediation, default risk and concern about financial stability was simply air-
brushed out of the standard mainstream models.  In such models the GFC simply could not occur.  
Thus, mainstream economists on the whole paid as little, or less, attention to financial stability 
issues as regulators.   
 
There were, of course, other problems with invalid beliefs, notably the belief, widely held amongst 
both bankers and credit rating agencies that a widely geographically diversified portfolio of US 
mortgages would not be risky, since the probability of a significant decline in US housing prices, over 
the whole country, was extremely unlikely.   
 
Commentators, especially perhaps journalists, like to attach blame to individuals, or sets of 
individuals, accusing them of venality, and other human flaws.  On this account, the main reasons for 
the GFC were common failures to appreciate the extent of risk that had been building up in the 
system, a failure that was common to those in authority, to economists, as well as to those more 
typically bearing the brunt of blame, such as bankers and credit rating agencies.   
 




The GFC exposed considerable shortcomings in the role of Central Banks, particularly a failure to give 
sufficient weight to the role of financial stability.  So most CBs now have an expanded mandate, to 
give more weight, perhaps equal weight, to financial stability as to price stability.  If you have two 
objectives that are separate, the Tinbergen Rule requires two sets of instruments to achieve greatest 
efficiency.  This has led to the growth and use of macroprudential measures of various kinds.  In 
addition, the depth of the 2008/9 crisis led to official interest rates falling to the zero lower bound 
(ZLB).  Since this was not, of itself, sufficient to restore either the major advanced economies to the 
target inflation rate (usually 2%), nor led to a satisfactory recovery in real output, there was an 
additional need for unconventional monetary policies, largely connected with increasing the size of 
the CB balance sheet, i.e. QE in various forms.   
 
Since there is a considerable overlap between macropru measures and monetary policy on one 
hand, and macropru and micropru control measures on the other, there has been some tendency for 
all three to be concentrated in the Central Bank.  But macropru and QE both involve, in many cases, 
interventions into politically sensitive areas, such as intervention in housing and other markets, and 
interaction with debt management more broadly.  Even though Central Banks have taken the 
initiative in expansionary policies to help our economies recover, in some large part because of 
constraints on the use of fiscal policy, they have run into criticism about whether their powers have 
become excessively broad, and their accountability insufficient. 
 
As a result, there are now voices challenging Central Bank independence (CBI); the state of 
confidence amongst Central Banks that their role is clear, that their instruments can be successfully 
calibrated to achieve their mandated targets, and that they are confident that they know exactly 
how and what to do, is slipping.   
 
Antoin Murphy in his later Chapter 12 invokes an analogy between the collapse of faith in bankers 
and central bankers after the GFC in 2008 and the collapse of faith in John Law and the Mississippi 
System in 1720.  Both involved houses of cards based on the belief of ever-rising asset prices, but 
both demonstrated the power of finance and monetary management (and mis-management) to 




One feature of financial crises is that they tend to generate radical proposals for reform of the 
system, which when subject to wider discussion tend to lead to a compromise outcome, as set out in 











Early 1800s Suspension of GS Ricardo’s Currency Board Bank Charter Act 1844 
1929-1933 Collapse of US Banking System Chicago Plan Glass-Steagall 
1970s Stagflation Monetarism Pragmatic Monetarism 
Now Collapse of Banking Systems Narrow Banking Ring-fencing and ? 
 
 
Do we need to re-think monetary policy? 
 
The fact that monetary policy has not (yet) been successful in bringing about a strong recovery after 
the Great Financial Crisis 2008/9 has suggested that there may be a need to rethink, at least some 
aspects of, monetary policy.  There are various different elements of this, as follows:- 
 
1) Raise the inflation target? 
If the ability of monetary policy to restore satisfactory growth and prevent deflation has been 
limited by hitting the zero lower bound, or the effective lower bound, then one suggestion that has 
been put forward is to raise the normal inflation target from 2% to, perhaps, 4%.  This runs into a 
number of difficulties as follows:- 
• If the current problem is that CBs cannot hit 2%, what is the point of raising the target, at 
least now, to 4%? 
• Whereas quality changes and technical innovations meant that 2% can be viewed as, in 
practice, close to price stability, the same could not be said of a target of 4%.  The latter 




• If the politicians and CBs change the target now to suit policy in the current conjuncture, 
would that not make it more likely that they would change the target in future to get a 
better chance of meeting their current objectives?  In short, would not a change in target 
lower the credibility of the whole exercise.   
 
 
2) Lean versus clean 
The GFC was caused by a financial crisis, notably the interaction of bank credit expansion with a 
housing price bubble.  Financial factors that lead to potential crises do not appear in CBs’ mandates 
or professed objective reaction functions.  So, the question is now often raised whether CBs should 
lean against financial asset booms and busts, and expand their reaction function to incorporate 
some measures of credit and asset prices.  This suggestion contrasts with the view that CBs should 
focus solely on inflation and the output gap, trusting in their ability to clean up in the aftermath of 
financial crises.   
 
This debate continues with economists, such as Borio at the BIS, suggesting that the authorities 
should lean against financial cycles, opposed by economists such as Lars Svensson, who argues that 
the case for doing so has not been satisfactorily made.   
 
But this debate has been largely put to one side by the development of macroprudential policies, 
additional to, and separate from, the general official short-term interest rate.  The generally 
accepted idea now is that CBs should try to use such macroprudential instruments relatively 
aggressively first.  Only if these are seen to fail, or to be unusable in practice, might it then be 
worthwhile to reconsider the mandate of the CB, whether to include leaning against financial cycles.   
 
3) Why so ineffective? 
If we are to rethink monetary policy, we need to know why it has failed to restore satisfactory 
growth, despite being more expansionary and accommodating than ever before in history.  There 
are many potential answers to this.  One of these is that a combination of demography, with a 
world-wide sharp improvement in the ratio of workers to dependents, and the opening-up of China 
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and Eastern Europe to the world’s trading system, introduced a huge positive supply-shock to the 
labour force.  This weakened labour bargaining power, reduced the natural rate of unemployment, 
and imposed continuing and severe downwards deflationary pressures on the world.  But this shock 
is now coming to an end, and may even reverse, as the baby boomers move into retirement, and 
migration from the agricultural interior in China to the manufacturing coast also comes to an end.  If 
so, the continuing deflationary trends of the last 30 years, or so, may now reverse, bringing about a 
return to more inflationary, and previously normal, conditions. 
 
Another, not-mutually exclusive explanation, is that the failure of central bank expansionary policies 
to succeed fully was partially due to the weakness of the transmission mechanism through 
commercial banks, as a combination of raised capital requirements, lower profitability, and massive 
fines for improper prior behaviour, weakened the banks, and led them to be ever more cautious in 
extending loans, leaving excess reserves unused.   
 
A third explanation is that labour-saving technology has been largely responsible for the weakness of 
wages and labour bargaining power.  As is well known, there is considerable disagreement about the 
extent and direction of technological innovations over future decades.   
 
 
4) What if another downturn? 
One of the major concerns about current monetary policy, is that it has largely used up all likely 
available instruments.  Interest rates have remained rock bottom and central bank balance sheets 
have expanded enormously, to a degree that worries many commentators.  Also, public sector debt 
ratios have continued to rise despite attempts at austerity, and the worsening dependency ratios 
and rising costs of health care, suggests that such public expenditures are likely to increase as a 
proportion of GDP.  This makes it more difficult to envisage aggressive Keynesian countercyclical 
measures.  In this context, with both monetary and fiscal policies largely exhausted, how could we 




Whereas a faster renormalisation of interest rates would give greater head-room for cuts in the face 
of future recessions, the increases in such rates, particularly with the massive debt overhang that 
has already occurred, could, of itself, tip our economies back into the recession which we might have 
such difficulty in countering.   
 
Where are CBs now? 
 
Let us contrast the state of CBs in the Great Moderation with that now following the Great Financial 
Crisis. 
Table 3 


























UMP, unconventional  




Groping At some risk 
 
Furthermore, CBs have, as noted earlier, been allocated a second objective, that of maintaining 
financial stability.  This has led to a dilemma.  If the associated powers of undertaking 
microprudential supervision and applying macroprudential instruments is allocated to an institution 
other than the central bank, then the CB will have responsibility of financial stability without being in 
control of either the information or the instruments needed to achieve that.  On the other hand, if 
the CB is given responsibility for micro supervision and macroprudential instruments, then the width 
of its power has extended so far that democratic legitimacy is called into question.  Moreover, the 
application of macroprudential instruments, at least in some cases, can take the CB into fields such 
as the housing market and debt management, which are both politically sensitive and more normally 
within the remit of the Ministry of Finance, rather than the CB.  Either way, the previously 
straightforward and relatively simple delegation of responsibility for controlling inflation, via the use 
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of a single instrument, i.e. the short term interest rate, has now become much more complicated 
and subject to debate.   
 
So, the future of the central bank in our economies now appears far more uncertain than it was 
during the splendid decades of the ‘Great Moderation’.  However, the future cannot, perhaps 
fortunately, be forecast.  The present conjuncture for central banks looks somewhat unstable, but 
how their future may develop remains opaque. 
 
 
